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I!l'fRODUCi.'IOB 
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·;.~ ~l~-. - . -.. ... .. :-
1. The first review of the activities of NMOG in Rwanda was despa~ched 
on 4 September 1992. In that review I addressed the assessment of NMOG 
~- ; ....... 
:-~-....'-!. 
tasks (stated and implied) 1 the concept of operations, Command and Con~rol -~~:-. 
. :--:'" ~i-~·~;:;\...~-}~~-,· 
mechanism and the administrative and logistic requirements of the mi.ssfoh··~·~-~.f..-::·- · 
. T""<":.; .... .:.:;-::"~~- ._. 
-- .. ...· ·"""'- .· .. "; . : __ ,:~i:~/;~:<·.: .. 
The very critical areas of the review include the need to define .-:~ .. : . 
1-2~~~~7;;~~:[ ;:.~ .' 
a Ceasefire Corridor, improving the Jr.3npower holding, funding and lOgistic -=-·5 · · 
•,-,:~_:.;-- ... ,,;::;:· "~"·¢~·: : ~-. "r.-- ~*1" .. • •·. ,.~·~·.· ·; 
~:::,.::.~~~~ -J_ -,~-~:-:.:.:~.~· 
In this review, I shall bring you up to date on the prog·(~s·s ~ .-... :···-·-. ... ~~ 
~#~~~i~.~: 
~cde in these and other areas of that review and report on areas in-~hi~~ · 




the Ceasefire Aqreement has been violated. 
. · :. 
· ... -. 
3. The aim of 
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\ 
" 
. . ... 
\ 
. _ ..... ., .... 
·• I . . • : ·. ·. > . 
":~~:: · _· .. :I~·.my .. ·.earller_.reviev, .. l d1d ·rationallz~ the·· need. t~r.: a:~~~~~~ ... :.:-
~d control structure···for- BMOO.:--···~~ -~·orts.ni~i~n·· ·Vhe~~~~~~~~- ·.· 
. .. - ·' . _,· ... : i ~:,~~:·~:·.;.~ /~: ' .. 
or civil, requires a control and coordinating centre to harmOirlze 8.nd 
direct its activities for the achievement ot its obJectives. 
- ··--- ---- --··- ---- -- -···-··· 
5. It is because of. this. need that I established an organizational 
structure that vas recommended to you. Though, the staffing is still 
J 
skeletal because of the absence of the Zimbabwean and Mall contingents.· 
I am pleased to report· that the HQ NMOG is .. f'ul..1y operational and is 
functioning effectivelJ like any other Ddlitary headquarters in the field. 
I must, however, note t}te extra strain which the fev staff must bear 
in order.to carry out the Jobs of those vho are yet to arrive. 
6. NMOG TASKS. The mandate of HMOG has remained the same. tlll-llOY. 
Consequently, -.the .. tasks and concept of operation ot NMOG bas also not 
. 
changed. In my last reviev, I assessed all these tasks and related them 
to the manpower required to execute the concept · ot operation. A total 
of 223 officers and 84 soldiers were recommended to you. 
1. . · This number-; which· is inadequate for a.n· ideal situation, given 
the ·terrain: ·iu · · Rvanda, · vas ·recommended keeping the constraints of OAU 
= Ill:: =~-
-· .. -: -.. ...· .. ..-
·¥.t:{ _.-:,;~~:·· 
'. ot. thi.s Observation Group. 
#.· • a. Desp17s the . handicap in personnel,_ :.~ve contl~ ·to: me.rch. on 
by interim ~sures using._ vbat ~sonnel: lll:e ·_available n~j From. the 
- ~ . . . r.. . 
·.personnel e.vaf.f.able,""!·-I. bave partialJ.i staffed· HQ ·NMOG,a.nd· the headquar~ers 
~.: . . .... . ...... " -· ..... 
·of the three Mil! tary Observation Zones (MOZs) and created 6 lk)bile 
' 
patrols of ~ officers· eacb~: · Given the frontageS of each of these zones~ 
it is extr~ely. "difficult for only 2 ·pa~rols to effectively cov~. each 
zone·and vitness all the numerous violations. 
9. In an. attempt tQ improve the effectiveness of our Qbservations, 
I had to cause the Zonal Comma~ders . and their ... staff, vbo should be 
controlllrig·.· and.c. c.oor.dinatitlg pat-rol activities, :-Yithin · tkeir zones,. to . . ....... . - ..... 
take part ·in physical patrolling. This arrangement has still ~t. put 
us in a position to.· be" physical vitne.sses to violations. rJle· best ve 
are· able to .. d9 nov· to -visit· the sites or any .viola:~ions reported .a.J?d 
. . ...... 
carry: .. , out .- investiga~iona:; · · Since·. our . patro~ mq ·.no~. :be.·. ~~-al 
witnes~es- ~o- ;·these Yiol.S.tions, ve have on several ·occasions~- foUnd:.: it 
difficult to condemn some violations because of lack ot obvious evidence •. 
.. CEASRFIRE. CORRIDOR __ .:
· 10- An. area in which NMOG has made much achiev~~nt is:-in ·the attempt 
t ,,. - ..... - ... ·-· ..__ . -
· .. ,~::,, :~.:··H;t~, ~~;~!-~ J~~:::~,::··.·,¥f:~~.· .. 
"'-~.-- . ~ '· . 
:~:.'~Ji~~y~' ~0~~.\~~?;t~~i,:..~ i\. 
. . ~... :··.' . ·.~ .... 
-~~~~ 4 ... -·· ·· .. , ... . ..... ·. . -- ....•.. 
- ~-.. . 
· I ·was br"iefea: bt:· field. ~otnmandere ·-on·· both-~ side.·: of. :..th~- · ~ar.:;zo.fte •.. 4t . . ... 
-· -- --·:-~·,;.-______ r ·• . • .-~.;· ·.-~:· ...... --·.·"-.~.·-'\ :.;::,.;. •• ·.6 '<~·\_; 
·each· ·brief l l was ~given ··the·- .. ~ttle :~ po.si tions ·,of • t,h~ forces of .the ~ 
. . . . .... 
·: c6R'IIt\dnder ·in··· ~hat·~ sector·· 
. . 
These·,;. positions. ·.were . plotted on ·SMOG .. maps. 
. .- ... ~-
····\. -
.-:i· 
.... From our· ups:,·~·· it was .clear .. that·.many·_of~ the· -positions. were .mere claims.t ~ · 
. . . . . . . . ~. . ~ .. - ~-~..:... ~ ·. -- . : _., 
.... It ·.wa's:· .. c-bmmon .. ~·to ·s~e ··"'t-he···de"fe~ces "of-=one. party located ·:~eep ·at ... ~the .rear.·-·--~·- r-.'.:. 
- - . . .. ~ ~· • ....- : ~ ~ . . ~-: 'r!'t .. - : 
of the' defence of the· '.ot~e~·· ·party; \__Also. there were .. claims ·to battle· · 
positions that have no units in them.· 
· 11. · On-· 3 -~september·· 1"992; ·I ordered· a· verificatiOfl oper~tion of all 
the oattle positions . on both= sides. · The· pat·rC!ls have been work~nq on . . . . 
t.l-tis since· then· by physica·lly· checking ever.Y claim and visiting each 
with .. Chief· Military Obs·ervers ·· (CMOs)' of both ·the Rwandaise Government 
and the Rwandese Patriotic Front for confirmations and agreement. 
12. ·These. ~onfirmations·· and··· aqre.f?m~nts have· led to the firm· . .. ' ... 
~stabiisfur,ent of 'a .total-· of 93 . hattle posi tlons for the RGF and 79 for .. 
·the RPF. A possible Ceasefir~·-line around which a corridor can be defined 
- . . . .. 
is contained ~t · Annex A. · The 'grid ·coordinates of .these posi tio~~ haye .. 
. al ~1) been· f i~ed anCI. coltiillUriicated ~to CMOS. to .forestal .an·y future changes··.-:. 
of positions. 
VIOLATIONS 
13. · . · ·wi th-in_.3..._ ·weeks- of- ·co~enclng operations., NMOG :received an avalanche. · . .. 
of ·report"ed :violations beth -trom ... the · RGW and RPF?. The· characters of 
l 
... .. :' ,. · .. · ..
0 :4.. 5 ·-
.. 
' ; . 
: · .• these: .. vlo;la..tions- ;var~ed .. f.rom ~exchanqes ·.of- artillrry,··i.~aortar-··and · .. hea;;y::. .. -··. · 
\ \ 1- . . 
. ··: .. • • . , ' ~,~chine . .arms."~ ires, :to_. lllille· ·l!IArfare • ·-: 1-'here ~ ·Als~ ·, rerrts :on. exc;h~qei · 
· :·:·.of· ~a~l· -9U;ft;:fi~esi·.:-masse~ ~.atta~ks:-:a~d. assault~y ·¥~~~try;. occupations : 
. ···- , · .• : o£ new ~:def ens lv~ ~si tions and · patrhl.linCJ . in · no-:ma1~land. '. Case-s 'Of~:·. . / 
~idnappi.ngs·~·and:-~oot"ings ...have .also be.eJ!.~repo~~d-.. · ,-·;~ .. · ·· .. , .. ,~;. ·--~- •. "- ·· - · 
·~ 
~1: 
14. NMOG has invest~g~ted each report it received. arid verified ·som~.-
.· .... ,. 
the violations,~~.Patrollinq ... is the most: ·rampant. · Cases, of e..'<changes··of· . . . 
.. small~ arms: ~ .oc~ui ; mos.t ly ·.·.in .. areas-·- wh.ere .. ~he- no.-:nan_! s ... ~d ·is ·very· ·thin 
-· bet"lieen ?O and 150 metres apart. The areas :where. this· cOndition exists 
are RU~ARA,ttA.,· ... MAS~..t· .,~W~- li.BA.Ll. •· hl_lis,· RUHENDA M.iyQve, ~.KAGOGO, 
··and NDAGO. -: .• A· ·-mutuctlly~ agreed._ sepa;ration ··.of.· forces· in~ ·these ·areas · i' 
desireable to reduce friction • 
•.· .. --. • 15 .•. ,.; ... · So ,f"a~ .:a· ~taJ. ~9.f ~59 _vio~a.tion repo~ts .. }lave .~een· recei Vf~· , Detail-s_ 
of .. the. violations along with. the~· facts f)f ·~MOO .investigation and comments· . 
are ·contained in .. the .Annex. 
· HONITORIBG OP ·· SUPPLIED AHD MOVBMRNT OF TROOPS:. -... · . :.. 
16. In my concept of operation. th~ monitoring of supplies and-movement· 
of troops were to- be· accomplished by the simultaneous application~ of 
.. ·. : ·and ·mass movement ·-:of~.:.troops ~-in .·the· .. forward areas • .-.. The·. second. is the · 
.~ ~ . 
... - taking .·o.f- .. s~ock.· of .. cur.;ren·t ... le.vels~-of. stores. of· ammunitions and. weapons 
... ... · .... :-:.,._.·, 
. ·' 5 "':;-. 
: ; 
I 
these violations varied from exchanges o~ artil\ery, 
_ ~chin~-_ a rills fire~ ~~- ~~-~~ _ wa~ fa~~:_ _ _:h~r~ "~: a_l ~ 
_,_ ___ o~., ~-m~~l gun fire~-~-- m~~~e~-~~=~~-k~ --~~-~ssaul~~~--~n 
.. __ of new._ def.ensive _p.QsiJ:~Q!l3.JD4 __ P<!t_~ll.i..M. ~;;.........;c.~-=.-.~---~ 
kidnappings and lootings have also been reported. 
14. 
\, 




and. Cases of ; -·-----·---.--- ., _____ --· 
verified some •. 
Some could not be verified. because of lack of obvious ~vidence. Of all.-
~-
t the violations, patrolling is the most rampant. Cases of exchanges of 
~ 
~--
small arms occur mostly in areas where the no-man's land is very thin 
"'' 
- between SO and 150 metres apart. The are~s where th~}. condition exists 
are RUGARAMA, MASAKA, KARWOGA, KIBALI hills, RUHENDA. 
:. 
i:' 
and NDAGO. A mutually agreed separation .:>f forces {~ 
1 
desireable to reduce friction. ~ 
Miyove, KAGOGO, 
these areas is 
15. So far a total of 59 violation reports have been received. Details-.· · · 
:~ 
~. 
of the violations il.ong with tl'ae facts of NMOG investig~tion and comments 
are contained in the Annex. 
16. 
MONITORING OP SUPPLIED AND MOVEME'lR OP TROOPS 
~-
-.... . 
In my concept of operation, the monitoring of suppll.es and movement 
... 
:r 
of troops were to be accomplished by the simultaneous applications of 
¢'· 
3 different checks. The first is the monitorinn of;:·the infiltration 
~ ~-
F .,.. ....... ,.. 
and mass movement of troops in the forward areas. re second is the 
f' 










..... · ~ -_. -.... -
:,... ~ ~ 
and then continue- to lllOnitor these levels by unscheduled inspections • 
.... 
. ·- ~. 
\ 
. .. : : ~-




. -- . 
And the --third -is~--monitor movement of ·lethal military stores and troops ·-·- \-- --
in to the combat &O:ea by -Use of checll: poin ta loca tP.d .in. . the . COIIIIIlwUca tion .. -~---\ . 
ZOne-S Of th·e 1 2 fOrCeS; ___ ·-_· --~--------- _. ·- .~· ~-- ~~=-~--~ --~··.·. - - - -_____ __:_ _____ ~ 
.. ---·. ---------------- ----~--_j . .. -: ---
17. Due to the ; present inadequacy of man·power, it is not possible 
to carry out a s~ultaneous execution of these checks as planned. As 
an interim measure therefore, I· have decided to prioritise the tasks 
and carry them out in phases. 
·----·---·---- ~- ---·--. ··-
18. The first _.Priority is the mpnitoring- of infiltration and mass 
' 
movement of troops·· in the forward areas. Since these activities would 
occur in the fonrard areas, and because of the shortage of manpower, 
I had to tie this task into the verification operation for battle 
positions. Therefore, while the Military Observer Teams (MOTs) are 
visiting various battle positions to confirm claims and at the same time ...... 
verifying reported violations, 
. -:--:.." 
;.-
they must also look out for any 
-:-~ ~ 
infiltrations or ~ss movement of troops. 
19. With only 2 patrols per zone who could be operating as far as 
35 kilometres from each other, it is needless to say that the forward 
edges of the bat~)e areas remain porous and subject to exploitation by 
any party for ~t~ols and massed movements. But this is the best that 
can be done now without adequate strength of officers. 
20. My second priority is monitorinq the movement of supplies and 
troops from the rear to the combat zones. Again, without personnel, 
-
·' 









...... ··· ~..: 
1 -· 
. -~ '; 
: .?'~~ •• 
it is not ·possible to mount check points to monitor the movement of lethal 
\ . ·-· . •· .. 
\ 
. mili~y st~res~ an~ conveyance o~ troops. __ ... -~~~~' =~-~..:...:..:~·-::-;·=--=-=·-
.. .:_ _____ ~:.:_ __ _:_:'\; ~~:\·--:~ __:_: ___ -- -~ .:._-_:::::_·· _:_ __________________ _:_~ _____ ..:__··- . - ··- ·- --.----- ... 
21. . Anot:~fllterim measure _I ____ have ta!ten in this case, is to. commit·-·-··-- .. 
the same patrols to assessing the strengths of fighting troops currently 
f . .. 
deployed in the battle positions. The aim of this assessment is to assist 
-. 
in monitoring any future changes in the level of the forces.--- · Therefore.,- ... 
since NMOG may not icn~w how and when reinforcements are moved f~;om rear 
to forward areas because of the lack of check points, an observed increase 
in the strengths of forward units would alert us on the probability of 
an intended attack. NMOG is still compiling information . from which it 
can make a reasonable estimate of the strengths on both sides of each 
of the 3 zones. 
ADMINISTRATIOR 
- .•. 
22. Out of Station Allowance. There are some civilian drivers assigned. 
to NMOG. These· drivers have been involved in duties that takes them .-
outside Kigali to the 3 zones being covered by NMOG. It is in my view, 
that out-of-station allowance be worked out for them in conformity with 
the Rwandese Government pay and allowances regulations to her workers 
which is 2.50 FRW per day. 
23. Since NMOG budget does not make provision for such allowance, 
I am suggesting that the OAU General Secretariat liaise with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Kigali, to work out a modality of paying the drivers. 
} 
- ~!"'. 
• ..... '1.· . --,. ·. . ·- :_. .. ,·:. 
8 
-~ 
··'~}~:_,,·it~!~/ .. · .
civilian 'sta-ff-~-.-~.·· - -:J 24. 
- -~ .. 
Insurance. : The participants on NMOG includin9 the -- . ..,.. 
~· \ . . 
are, in the course· of discharginq their duties, exposed to,some hazards. 
-··· ---- . -· ·--'- :_ ·- ·-··· •· ---- -· .. -·. -· -·· -····- ·- ...... ---- •. , ---- ·- -~ . ·- --· -----·. -----·····•· 
-----.In .. view . of .. this,__z_ am . ..recommending . ..that. ~n._.insur.an: e .. .policy. be ~orke4. -------· __ . ~ . - .. - .. 
\ -- -·-··--·-··- ... --- .. ---
out to cover all m!_li tary _and ci vilia~ ~~~~~ <?R __ ~~ ~~! t_!_~l!_~~---- _ .. _______ · _____ _ 
-·- - . ---~-~~-------~~-~ --· .-~~-.. :=-=~1 +~·~=~--=----
Medical. '!;!Jere is the need to-arrange for a eound ~1 care 
~ -~ 
25. 
for both the military and civilian staff· of NMOG, a system that would 
allow for NMOG staff to receive medical consultations and attention--"fro~ 
the Rwandese Government Medical Centres. 
LOGISTICS 
26. The logistic branch was established to enhance the functions of 
NHOG. This branch is however saddled with problems of transport, 
accommodation and supply. 
-~: 
27. Transport. ~-Most oF the vehicles .organic to NMOG presently are 
· .. ~ 
old ones. As sucftj· the fuel consumption rate of each of them is so hiqh. -··-~ 
Likewise they are:: constantly breakinq down and thus beinq sent to the .--
garage. To keep t:pese vehicles on road and in qood working conditions 
we require funds._ In view of this, it is suggested that fund for 
maintenance and fu~l be included in the OAO budget forecast for NMOG. 
28. Accommodation. Accommodation for the .'Military Observers to be 
deployed to Bywnba and Ruhenqeri zones are ready. That of Mutara zone 
• 
- 1 . 
l 
J 
1 / . ·---~ ~~~======~~~---





is however not.ready as they have not- been furnished. The arrival of 
the contingents .from Mall . .:....An.4.:._:_L~bwe- .wi).l. mean .. increase. in _living ___ _...;o. __ • 
. - . accommOdation- req\alreme.nt:---Tlie-ae£a~Is woulaoeco~unlca~ea-ii_rjor-:-----
in due course. 
29. Material. Some foreign embassies_ in. fig ali · promised NMOG some 
material. These ~nclude uniforms and radio communication sets. . These 
are still being expected. I would wish however that OAU Ge~eral 
Secretariat take up this issue with-nations concerned, as these materials 
are very essential for enhanced operations of NMOG. 
CONCLUSION -
30. The month ..in review has seen NMOG operating in the field using 
interim means. There have been some good achievement especially as it 
concerns NMOG eff-orts at determining a possible corridor between the 
armed oppositions. The operations out in the_ fie~~-- .b~Y~---~.lsQ_.e:l)_~~~.d 
..:-": 
:.:.-;): 
us to adjudge the__capability of vehicle~ on ~ operations. 
·-~·· 
:...;:. 
31. It is in t~is view that I am reiteratin9 the need for OAO General 
Secretariat to review the strength of the contingents. It is also 
essential that attention be paid to issues highlighted in the initial 
situation report as well as this one to permit effectiveness of NMOG. 
RECOHMENDA'fiONS 
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-~ ·-···- \" - .... 
... 
-+---- -~--- ··----·-- -·· -- .. -- _____ -.._-_;.:_.~-·~-=:..:. . ..:;·_ ~· 
(a) Man~~er :~~~~~~1~.~-:· r~view~:-.----------~ -- ,~ . . The·-::~ed oppo.sitions~·'made to mutually agree to separate 
--~1£~ .. ~ 
(b) 
in-areas wqere the no-man's land is between 50 and 150 metres-
-· 
apa~t.-
(c) Personal emolument for civilian drivers be approved. 
(d) An insurance policy be worked out to cover participants --
· on NMOG operations. 
·. 
(e) A suitable arrangement for medical cover for NMOG personnel 
to be~.worked out with the Government of Rwanda by the OAU. 
~l-.. , ... 
-···--·-
-~ 
(f) OAU ?:~eneral Secretariat should liaise with the donor 
-·-.-..,., 
·..lp..":-
countiies who pledqed logistic support to make good their 
~~ 
pled~~· 
.... 
. -
EB OPALBYB 
Major General 
Camaander 
